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JD degree (1975) from UCLA where Judge Kozinski was graduated
first in his law class of 300. He served as managing editor of the
UCLA Law Review.
DEAN JAMES BOND (BOND): A three-judge Philadelphia district
court recently issued its decision in ACLU v. Reno,' invalidating the
Internet "indecency" provisions of the Communications Decency Act.
Judge Dalzell writes, "The Internet is a far more speech-enhancing
medium than print, the village green, or the mails. The Internet may
fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversation. As the
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet
deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion. Any
content-based regulation of the Internet, no matter how benign the
purpose, could bum the global village to roast the pig." Judge
Kozinski, do you agree or disagree with Judge Dalzell's view of the
Internet and his expansive reading of the First Amendment?
1. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI (KOZINSKI): I was amused by the "roast
pig" reference in Judge Dalzell's opinion. If you take the phrase
"information superhighway" and create an anagram by rearranging its
letters, you can spell out "enormous hairy pig with fan." You can also
spell out "a rough whimper of insanity" and "I swamp horrify huge
nation." Try it out.
I share the reaction of Richard Dooling, writing for the New York
Times,2 who described the decision as a two hundred-plus page
opinion from the third branch of government, telling us that an
obviously unconstitutional statute is obviously unconstitutional.
Generally, it seems to me the result was correct, and I share many of
Judge Dalzell's sentiments.
Unfortunately, when people talk about the Intemet, they tend to
talk in terms of analogies or metaphors-the "information superhigh-
way," the "global village," the "continuing conversation." I don't
think that these do much to advance the analysis. Indeed, they tend
to hide what the real issues are.
Consider the idea of the Internet as the most awesome means of
communication the world has ever known. Of course, we know that
television is that, and not the Internet. It's hard to know how many
people are on-line these days, but a recent report I've seen estimates
around 30 million people worldwide, out of 5 billion. In the United
States, estimates zoom all the way up to 20 million people. But it is
to some extent an overstatement to claim that the wave of the future
is already here.
People with means and an interest in engaging in this kind of
communication have been willing to spend a lot of disposable time and
dollars using their computers essentially for entertainment. There are
other uses, legitimate and illegitimate, of the Internet, but most of you
here use it for discretionary, leisure activities. If we take into account
this reality, any serious expansion, if there is to be one, is still in the
future.
What we're seeing now is similar to the early days of radio. If
you were into radio communication, were technically inclined, and
could afford it, you got a transmitter and did a little broadcasting. To
regulate the airways, Congress came up with the Radio Act.3 At that
time, too, there were cries of censorship. As much as I'm of a
libertarian bent, I recognize that there are few human interactions
2. Richard Dooling, Most of These Guys Are Lawyers, Right? N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996,
§ 1, at 19.
3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1994).
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outside the privacy of the home that will not involve some type of legal
gatekeeping, some rules of the road, some governmental involvement
either to encourage or to prohibit certain transactions.
I am on the "Net" frequently. I often cruise, looking for islands
of humor, to which I then alert some friends. Lately, I've been
receiving long and contentious messages, phrased in extreme terms,
hysterical that the Communications Decency Act will subjugate
freedom on the Internet. Once I found time to read these interminable
messages, I started asking myself and others some questions.
In fact, one of the messages was sent to me by a law student. I
decided this was a good time to teach him a lesson about government
and constitutional law. So I wrote back and said, I've read the letter
you sent me and 120 other people, and that you asked us to forward
to Congress, objecting to the CDA. There are some pretty extreme
claims in there. Do you really mean to suggest that communications
on the Internet can't be controlled at all? For example, how about
blackmail? How about espionage? How about child pornography?
Are you in favor of downloading "snuff flicks"? Is the Internet so
different from all other forms of communication that it stands beyond
all format control? I thought that I did a respectable job, trying to
arouse this particular young lawyer's interest, and hoping to challenge
him. Well, he wrote back to me a day or so later and said, "I have
your very interesting letter, Judge Kozinski. I will certainly study it
after my exams, and I will get back to you." As you can guess, he
never did.
To bring this answer to a close, I generally think that the Internet
community-just like all other speech communities-ought to be
afforded First Amendment protections. I don't see any reason why
Internet speech should be treated any less favorably than other kinds
of speech. But the vastly overblown claim that the communications
medium somehow deserves to be put outside normal legal con-
straints-because it's so global, or because it's so different-is self-
defeating. It substitutes generalities and sentiments for real thinking.
The kind of analysis we've seen at this conference-the kind of debate
we've had here-is very useful, because we're talking about the
specifics of what legal constraints should be allowed. Not whether
there should be regulation, for clearly there must be. The real
question is, what should they be and how far should it go?
BOND: So, in essence, you reject Justice Black's view of the First
Amendment that "no law" means "no law?"4  You're willing to
4. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
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acknowledge that in some, as yet undefined, set of circumstances, it's
wholly appropriate for the government to regulate the use of the
Internet to protect interests that might otherwise be injured?
KOZINSKI: It's a compelling question. I want to make sure that
by signing on to it, I'm not signing on to too much. But, I think the
answer is yes. I believe that even Justice Black himself did not mean
to be absolute when he said "no law" means "no law." I think that all
speech is subject to some constraints. I take for granted the assump-
tion that, when we are talking about speech, we ought to think very
carefully about what the constraints ought to be. But, I do believe
there are other public interests, and that it is possible to hurt people
with speech. For example, child pornography videos inflict injury on
the children that act in them.
BOND: You mentioned earlier that you were distrustful to some
degree of analogies and metaphors. Yet, we all know that the law
tends to grow into new areas by analogy and by metaphor. In the area
of the Internet, of course, we already have a huge body of law called
intellectual property. And there are a host of difficult questions about
the relationship, if any, between doctrines in that area and regulation
of the Internet. John Perry Barlow, in an article entitled "The
Economy of Ideas,"' claims that existing intellectual property law
cannot be reworked to apply to digitized expression, and that there
should be no legally enforceable rights of ownership in digital products.
How do you react to the general claim that much of current intellectual
property law, particularly trademark and copyright law, simply cannot
be applied by analogy to the problems raised by the Internet?
KOZINSKI: When I first saw Barlow's statement, I was a bit
repelled. But, the more I think about it, the more I believe there is
some wisdom to what he says, without signing on entirely. Years of
experience, judicial and otherwise, have taught me that intellectual
property advocates will grab whatever rights they can. If you stroll
down the street humming someone's tune, he will sue you and demand
that you pay him a royalty. Very often, what owners of intellectual
property don't realize, or aren't willing to grasp, is that they are
traveling a two-way street. A fairly broad margin of fair use often
generates interest in the copyrighted work.
I harken back ten, twelve, or fifteen years ago. When VCRs first
came out, the movie industry went berserk. The movie moguls said,
"We'll never make another movie again. Who will bother to make
5. John Perry Barlow, Wired 2.03: The Economy of Ideas (visited Mar. 26, 1997)
<http://www.hotwired.com/wired/2.03/features/ economy.ideas.html>.
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another movie if, as soon as you put it on tape, everyone can copy the
tape?" Recall the BetaMax case?6 The movie industry was up in
arms that rental stores would buy a movie for eighty dollars and rent
it out for two or three dollars. Now they were saying, "Who will ever
buy another movie again for eighty dollars, when they can rent it for
three dollars?" Anyway, the movie industry lost that battle, and what
has happened as a result? The market in tape-recorded movies has
become vastly greater than anybody ever imagined, precisely because
people are able to rent movies at the local video store. Because they
do not have to say, "Gee, if I buy a VCR and I want to see any
movies, I'm going to have to pay eighty dollars a pop every time."
They don't have to make that large economic decision. They can buy
a VCR for two or three hundred dollars, and every time they want to
see a movie, they can rent it. Once the movie industry lost the
BetaMax battle, its market for tapes largely became the movie rental
market. It's an inherent part of the industry. I think that anyone who
looks at the situation objectively would conclude that the user and
rental stores have been good for the movie industry.
Intellectual property is not just the thing itself. It's not just the
film. It's not just the television program. It is not just the written text
of a book. It is the entire package. With software, for example, it is
software support. Let's face it, most sophisticated software doesn't
work in a manner that's obvious to the average consumer. You've got
to make that "support service" phone call, and ask, "Why won't 'Duke
Nukem' load on my machine?" There's a big difference between
having a shareware copy, or a pirated copy, or a borrowed copy, and
actually having the retail item, complete with manuals and technical
support.
Much the same is true of books. You can download a lot of
books on the Internet. But who wants to read them that way? Do you
want to sit in front of a CRT and bum your eyes out? Do you want
to print it out on your laser printer, and then manage a load of several
hundred loose pages? No, you want the book. It's worth the twenty
or thirty dollars to own a real book.
Dave Barry gets circulated on Internet gag lists all the time. I
bought a couple of his books because someone sent me some of his
articles. I said, "Hey, this guy's pretty funny. I think I'll go out and
look for his books." Happens all the time.
To some extent, then, I join Barlow in his sentiment. The fears
that the global communications network will destroy copyright are
6. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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vastly overblown. In many ways, I think, there are flip sides. There
are advantages to the copyright holder when Internet users get to try
out software, get to see bits and pieces of books, or the like.
BOND: Allow me another follow-up question. As I listened to
what you were just saying, I wondered whether the economics of the
Internet will ultimately determine the scope of legal protection of
various aspects of the Internet. Until someone demonstrably is making
money at the expense of someone else's initial investment, will there
likely be any need to regulate the use of the Internet with respect to
trademark and copyright?
KOzINSKI: I don't mean to be predictive, for I don't know what
will actually happen. I'm only saying that I'm wary about over-
regulation of intellectual property on the Internet. I have become wary
in court, where I've witnessed lawyers say, "If you don't issue a TRO,
if you don't give us this or that, the value of this intellectual property
will be destroyed." Lo and behold, the court doesn't give the thing
they ask for, and the property is not destroyed. Predictions of what
the future will bring are always apocalyptic, particularly by people who
think their proprietary interests are being infringed. My suggestion
would be that the law tread very carefully in this area. Before we start
adopting intellectual property legislation for the Internet, before we
start trying to solve problems, we need to see some documented
instances of these problems. We may be doing exactly what the
owners of intellectual property want us to do, but we very well may
end up with a policy that's neither good for them nor good for the rest
of us.
BOND: The floor's yours, ladies and gentlemen. This is a rare
opportunity. Seldom do laypersons get an opportunity to direct
questions to a sitting judge. Usually, the questions go the other way.
So take advantage of this opportunity.
QUESTION: Does a U.S. court have jurisdiction over a web server
located outside the United States just because it can be accessed from
the United States? If the operator of the web site has no U.S. assets
or connection to the United States, why should the courts have
jurisdiction?
KOZINSKI: Oy veh! It's hard for me to answer that question for
a couple of reasons. First, it's a specific legal question that might
conceivably come up one day in my court. Second, it also doesn't have
quite enough facts for me to give a meaningfully specific answer.
Generally, however, jurisdiction is a question of real-world power.
The courts may enjoy all the theoretical jurisdiction you can imagine,
but if they can't get their hands on some person or some set of assets,
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it won't do you any good at all. To use a non-Internet analogy, for
years and years the United States transmitted capitalist propaganda
behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe; it was highly illegal under
Soviet law, but what could the U.S.S.R. do about it? You can't
exercise jurisdiction over someone whose body you don't have or
whose assets you don't have.
We may care very much that someone offshore is providing a web
site that downloads pornographic or other undesirable materials. But
there's nothing much that we can do about it under domestic law. I
think it's well worthwhile for us to pursue international treaty
relationships with other countries to try to stamp such things out. If
we are interested in keeping these things away from our borders, that's
one way of doing it. Then, you have to realize that we must submit,
to some extent, to the sensibilities of people in other parts of the world.
But I haven't given up on technology. Often, the Internet is
presented as afait accompli. It is here and there's not much we can do
about it. America can keep ballistic missiles from entering and hitting
our cities, but we can't keep pornographic messages off our shores? I
don't think so.
It's not clear to me at all that having a wide-open, single Net
where people can get on and say whatever they want, whenever they
want, free of any governmental or private control, is the way things are
going to go. This may simply be the way things are evolving now, so
long as only those of us in the intelligentsia or affluent society are able
to get on. But, when you start getting Internet access by people who
have to spend only a few hundred dollars for a platform, perhaps using
a television or a telephone, we may well see a breaking up of the
whole-body Internet into specific smaller components, intranets of
sorts, where access will be restricted by private contract. It is nowhere
written that every road has to connect to every other road. And in
solving a lot of these problems, both internationally and domestically,
the answer may well be private contract, not government intervention.
BOND: The judge has used the phrase "the information highway"
several times. I must share with you the story of an e-mail message
that I received a couple of weeks ago from a former colleague. He
related that a North Carolina legislator had asked the governor's office
precisely where the information highway was going to be located
within the state, and whether the state police force would have to be
expanded in order to patrol it. A question from someone perhaps
more sophisticated than that?
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QUESTION: Ought there to be a constitutionally protected right
to be anonymous on the Internet? Do I have a constitutionally
protected right to refuse to disclose my true identity on the Net?
KOZINSKI: We have a culture that cherishes anonymity to a large
extent. This very problem comes up in a variety of communications
contexts. One of them is the "caller-ID" service on the telephone.
Many people are incensed that, if they call, someone on the other end
may figure out who they are. Somehow, this is perceived as an
invasion of privacy.
What do I think of this? Do you have the right to knock on
someone's door with a bag over your head? I'm not at all sure that
you are entitled to access people's homes by telephone or by computer,
and not make it known who you are. In the currently wide-open
electronic regime, I have a serious problem with anonymous e-mailers.
I think much mischief can be done in an environment where most of
us are knowledgeable enough to run a web browser, or knowledgeable
enough to send and receive e-mail, but not knowledgeable enough to
change our domain names. I might feel differently if we submitted to
anonymity contractually. If you belong to an intranet or subnetwork
where you sign onto sending or receiving anonymous messages, that
would be just fine.
Again, we might worry about the kind of things that can be done
once you don't know who the sender is. You might worry about
blackmail, espionage, pornography, or simple harassment. It's a bit
intimidating to have your mailbox flooded with a thousand anonymous
messages. "Well, how about changing mailboxes," you might think,
but that's a huge inconvenience. And you should not have to suffer
that.
Again, in an environment where everything is wide open, it may
well be that we will come to the conclusion that only legislation will be
able to deal with it. But, I'm not quite sure, for there may well be
private solutions.
BOND: I have three questions here, all of which raise issues of
First Amendment protection for particular kinds of messages or
images. I'm going to give the judge all three, and he might evaluate
any or all of them within the time frame that remains. The first
question asserts as a premise that the activities of the Nazi party and
the Ku Klux Klan have exploded on the Net, and asks how much
protection such messages ought to get. More particularly, is this a
type of hate speech that might be prohibited? The second question
hypothesizes fully computer-generated images, which would otherwise
be illegal if they were actual photographs, such as child pornography.
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What if a computer user generated the image of a child so that there
was no photographic subject who has been personally victimized? The
final question focuses on the difference between print texts and
electronic texts. It asks that, unless the electronic medium is entitled
to the same constitutional protection as the print medium, how might
we deal with the fact that an increasingly large numbers of texts will
be in both print and electronic forms, or perhaps only in electronic
form? With these three specific issues in mind, the general question
is how do we wrestle with such First Amendment problems in the
context of the Internet?
KOZINSKI: Regarding hate speech, I would not apply any special
law to the Internet. I haven't seen much hate speech on the Internet
myself, but I know there are forums where people engage in hate
speech. I can't see how that is constitutionally capable of being
prohibited. If hate speech occurs on a bulletin board, or in a chat
room, where people come and go, the sanction may be that people will
leave and won't come back. But I can't imagine how it could be
legally prohibited. In many ways, there is a far less strong case for
prohibiting hate speech on the Internet than for prohibiting the
burning of a cross in front of a black family's home. Assume that the
cross is not on their property, so you don't have the hook of a property
crime. Let's say someone is walking on the sidewalk with a burning
cross. That invades the privacy of the home. It makes it difficult for
the targets to leave their home. The homeowner would have to
confront the hate speaker in entering and leaving the house, and that
presents a much stronger case for prohibition. Nevertheless, we have
a lot of difficulty prohibiting even that, consistent with the First
Amendment. It's much harder to justify prohibiting hate speech which
is confined to a chat room or a Usenet group, and is seen by no one
who doesn't go there.
Things change, it seems to me, once hate speech is directed to
particular people. Getting hate e-mail should be no different from
getting hate any other kind of mail. Whether this could be prohibited
depends on whether the same letter, if put in the U.S. mail, would be
subject to punishment. I can't see any reason why we should apply a
different standard. I'd have to hear the argument in the context of a
particular case. Off the top of my head, however, it doesn't seem to
me there's any particularly strong reason to punish or prohibit one
more than the other.
Again, I want to emphasize that currently we do have a relatively
open Net." If we keep thinking about it like the Post Office, if we
keep thinking that the streets leading from everyone's doorstep must
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connect to everyone else's doorstep, we are going to keep running into
these kind of problems. This is not necessarily the case. As a
contrast, let me give you the example of the intranet we have in our
court. This net reaches judges all the way from Fairbanks, Alaska, to
Billings, Montana, and from Hawaii all the way down to San Diego.
We generate tens of thousands of e-mail messages a month. We all
write to each other, and we write to other court personnel, but nothing
ever comes through there that is not in some way court-related. And
in the eleven years of being a Judge, I have never seen the system
misused, because the intranet is so tightly regulated and because every
message goes first through our server in San Francisco, so everyone
knows exactly where the message comes from. Any attempt to run a
prank or to clog up the system would be detectable immediately. I am
not at all sure that a lot of problems with hate speech, as with
copyright infringement or pornography, can't be solved simply by
having people connect through technology only to those people they
really want to talk to.
It sometimes gives you a great sense of freedom to be able to get
on your computer and connect to anywhere else in the world. What
you've got to realize is that when you connect with everybody else in
the world, everybody else in the world is connected to you as well.
And there's a cost involved in that.
The question of computer-generated images has been sticking in
the back of my mind, and it's difficult to come to grips with. I
certainly think that computer-generated child-pornographic images
raise more limited concerns than actually photographing real children.
Let me approach this more gingerly by considering, first, computer-
generated pornography depicting adult subjects. Arguably, in such
cases, one's privacy interests stop with one's own body. Accordingly,
I would be very wary of First Amendment protection for Esquire's
antics of twenty or thirty years ago, when the magazine ran a picture
of Henry Kissinger in the nude, by grafting a photo of Kissinger's head
onto a photo of the unclothed body of another man.
When dealing with minors, however, it seems to me that there are
several forms of potential injury. Being involved in the real sexual act
is certainly the worst of them. But children may have to live for the
rest of their lives with wrongs that happened in childhood. If you use
the faces of real children, and then manipulate them in such a way as
to make it appear that the children were engaged in sexual activities,
I would be concerned about continuing harms inflicted on them as they
grow up by having images on the Internet that make it look like they
engaged in child pornography. I would have to think long and hard
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as to whether the First Amendment would entitle a pornographer to
morph the faces of real children on computer-generated bodies.
Certainly, the problem is different if the child pornography consisted
entirely of made-up faces and bodies.
Finally, regarding the question of print versus electronic texts,
there are clear distinctions between the media forms. Presumptively, I
would start with the idea that they are to be afforded the same kind of
safeguards, both in terms of copyright and First Amendment protec-
tions. Yet, I think that if we don't account for the differences between
the various media forms, we're likely to go astray. Arguably, the
differences are very easily bridged. For example, you can take an
excerpt of a printed book, and using a scanner and OCR software, you
can turn it into a digitized electronic counterpart within minutes. But
we ought to remember what we were talking about earlier-John Perry
Barlow's suggestion that the packaging may be the most important part
of a copyrighted work. When you upload a book, what you get is not
exactly a book. You have a different thing. You can't carry it in a
pocket or read it in bed. It may not be something people are willing
to use in lieu of a book. And the author, the copyright holder, might
not have lost very much at all.
BOND: Judge, we are at the witching hour. Thank you very
much.
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